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THE NORMATIVE STANDING OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE: AN ARGUMENT FROM 
NON-DOMINATION 
 
William Lucy
*
 
 
 
“Why all this ruckus about such a pipsqueak issue as court fees?”1 
 
What do we mean when we speak of access to justice? Why, if at all, should that notion be 
thought valuable? These two questions are the fulcrum of this article. The first occupies Part 
I, which offers an account of the nature of access to justice that both captures some of its 
complexities and is consistent with most usages of the notion in academic and policy 
discourse. Part II addresses the second, albeit in a limited way. After outlining, in section A, 
what is involved in showing the value of access to justice, it examines in section B just one 
substantive argument – from non-domination – to that end. Part II is therefore merely one 
step in a properly general response to the second question, which would consider all plausible 
answers to that question. While limited in that way, Part II nevertheless aspires to show the 
interest and fecundity of the argument from non-domination. Furthermore, although this part 
makes no effort to discredit all other answers to the second question, it does demonstrate that 
the argument from non-domination performs better than a pair of more popular responses to 
the second question. They are the arguments from the rule of law and from equality, which 
are examined in section C.  
Why these questions and why now? There are at least two reasons. First, and most 
obviously, because the costs associated with access to justice have been and are a pressing 
political issue in many of the common law jurisdictions.
2
 Governments with economic 
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austerity measures in mind have sought out many areas of public expenditure for reduction, 
legal aid and cognate budgets being among them. They have suffered accordingly. The 
reduction of funding to provincial governments has resulted in the erosion or eradication of 
funding for (usually free) legal advice centres. In England and Wales, the process of paring 
back central and local government funding for legal advice and representation, combined 
with significant increases in court fees, has met considerable criticism. Among critics, some 
lawyers have portrayed this process as being unfair, putting recourse to law beyond the reach 
of all but the wealthy.
3
 To assess complaints such as these presupposes some sense of the 
value access to justice might have. This article examines one such value.  
The second reason arises from the fact that, even if access to justice were not a 
pressing political issue, its alleged normative significance would still be worthy of juristic 
attention. For this feature of legal institutional design, like any other, should be examined in 
relation to its supposed point or value. Lawyers and jurists rightly spend a good deal of time 
considering the point, purpose, or value of a wide range of substantive legal areas, and there 
is no reason why this concern should not extend to more procedural-cum-institutional aspects 
of the legal system like access to justice. The way the justice system operates and is 
organized, including the nature of the trial process, the organization of courts and related 
institutional forms, and the appointment and behaviour of judges, magistrates, and other 
system personnel is surely just as important an area of study as that system’s various 
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substantive bodies of doctrine. Furthermore, it might be that these procedural-cum-
institutional aspects are more important than the latter in this sense: they are the aspects of a 
legal system its users encounter first. Therefore, they have an immediate effect upon a 
system’s accessibility and utility.  
This second reason takes an explicitly jurisprudential slant in what follows, and two 
research hypotheses explain this. The first concerns the limits of contemporary legal 
philosophy, which ranges over both the core questions of descriptive analytical jurisprudence, 
on the one hand, and normative moral and political philosophy, on the other. Chief among the 
questions that preoccupy analytical jurists is “what is law?” whereas some of the central 
questions of moral and political philosophy include “what is a good life?” and “what is 
justice?” Much legal philosophy in the last four decades has brought work of the latter kind to 
bear upon large segments of legal doctrine, the burden of such work being in part that of 
determining the moral and political standing of the area of law in question. The most 
interesting instances of such work have examined the moral and political status of, inter 
multos alios, constitutional, administrative, land, contract, criminal, tort, and international 
law.
4
 
The questions animating this article locate it within the latter tradition, although the 
article attempts to extend the tradition’s boundaries. For it is one thing to examine the 
normative basis of a complex, but broad, swathe of substantive law, such as unjust 
enrichment, and seemingly quite another to investigate the normative basis of an aspect of 
legal institutional design like access to justice. Since numerous areas of substantive law 
appear clearly related to many of our intuitions about right and wrong, the task of 
interrogating those intuitions, and of examining their alleged connections with those areas of 
law, looks both salient and fruitful. Access to justice, by contrast, might be such a varied and 
jurisdictionally specific aspect of legal institutional design that it lacks any obvious 
connections with moral or political intuitions. The remainder of this article challenges this 
view.
5
 It does so by examining the way in which one account of political morality can 
support access to justice, and, in so doing, it presents a test case for that account. If this 
account provides illumination here, then it might illuminate much else besides. Our narrow 
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focus thus allows us to assess the degree of determinacy we should expect from broad and 
relatively abstract normative theories.  
The second hypothesis begins with an observation. By far the greatest part of the 
access-to-justice literature concerns the identification and measurement of what was once 
called (unmet) legal need and what are now called (unresolved or unadvised) justiciable 
problems.
6
 This work has been vital in charting the very limited reach of traditional sources 
of legal information and advice, having also influenced policy developments in the common 
law world. Yet this literature has a glaring gap, to some extent explicable given its primary 
focus: missing is an account of why unmet legal need, or unaddressed-cum-unadvised 
justiciable problems, should be considered bothersome. Of course, those affected by such 
problems may well have prudential or self-interested reasons to worry, but what if many so 
affected were impervious to such reasons? Normative considerations are not primarily 
determined by prudence or self-interest and may thus provide an answer – or series of 
answers – to the question of what makes unmet legal need, or unaddressed justiciable 
problems, troublesome. This, then, is the payoff from bringing the empirical access-to-justice 
literature into contact with the kind of normative enquiry pursued here. In showing why 
access to justice matters, normatively speaking, this article also shows why unmet legal need 
or unaddressed justiciable problems matter.  
 
I. ACCESS TO JUSTICE: WHAT? 
 
When lawyers and citizens speak about access to justice, they only rarely have in mind the 
various political-philosophical conceptions of (mainly) distributive justice that dominate 
academic discourse and, occasionally, animate policy discussion.
7
 Most frequently, the 
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justice in play in talk about access to justice is the justice supposedly embodied in the “justice 
systems” of contemporary nation-states. All of those systems, in addition to having sub-
systems of “criminal justice,” “civil justice,” “family justice” and the like, have at least three 
broader or more general components that constitute the domain of access to justice.
8
 One 
concerns the production and promulgation of legal knowledge itself; another relates to 
guidance about that knowledge; and a third involves access to those institutional forms – 
usually, but not exclusively, courts and tribunals – charged with resolving disputes within 
justice systems. 
The first and second components of access to justice are interestingly connected. In 
common law jurisdictions, the production and promulgation of legal knowledge is principally 
a matter of reporting the decisions of courts in contested cases, on the one hand, and the 
publication of the outputs of the legislative process, in the form of statutes and related 
instruments, on the other. That is the law. Legal knowledge in these jurisdictions therefore 
consists of case law and statute law as well as the rich bodies of technically demanding 
commentary upon both that we find in legal textbooks and other forms of juristic analysis. 
Since statutes and case reports in electronic form are now easily available to all with Internet 
access in the common law jurisdictions, most citizens are therefore able to acquaint 
themselves with the law. That cases (in the form of law reports) and statutes should be easily 
publicly available follows from one requirement of the rule of law ideal. For, whatever else 
that ideal entails, it certainly requires that laws be published; only then will addressees of the 
law know what is required of them and only then can law function as a means of subjecting 
human conduct to the governance of rules.
9
 For obvious reasons, this first component of 
access to justice can be labelled the “legal knowledge (LK) component.”  
Since legal knowledge, in the form of law reports and statutes, is so easily available, 
one may wonder why the second component of access to justice is necessary.
10
 If the law is 
accessible to all, why is guidance needed about what it requires? Posing the question shows, 
for lawyers at least, its naivety. Legal knowledge is complex. Why? If we set aside a sceptical 
explanation – that the law’s complex (or recondite or esoteric) nature is a consequence of its 
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guardianship by a professional elite seeking to maintain its power and expertise – what non-
sceptical grounds could account for this? Some degree of complexity surely arises from the 
fact that current legal knowledge draws upon a long tradition and rich vocabulary of legal 
concepts that do not always overlap with ordinary common-sense concepts. Moreover, even 
when legal concepts have direct equivalents in ordinary language and thought – think, for 
example, of causation or intention, reasonableness and loss – the apparent correspondence is 
sometimes far from exact. One reason for this is that legal concepts have to withstand more 
weight and stress than their non-legal equivalents, being subject to forensic scrutiny where 
the stakes are very high indeed. One’s life or one’s liberty might depend upon whether a 
judge and a jury thinks one “intended” X as opposed to Y. In that context, it will come as no 
great surprise if the legal conception of intention departs in some aspects from its non-legal 
equivalent.  
In addition, there appear to be some legal concepts that either have no analogues in 
ordinary understanding, or, when they do, the legal counterpart is esoteric. The notion of 
ownership is an important part of our ordinary, everyday conception of the world that must, 
with regard to estates in land in England at least, be converted into the “fee-simple absolute 
in possession.” The latter, of course, is far removed from our ordinary understanding of full 
ownership, yet it is a bedrock principle of land law. The actus reus requirement for most 
serious crimes is a similarly fundamental principle within criminal law that, although easily 
translatable into a common-sense equivalent, has often been treated opaquely by common 
lawyers. On issues like these, lawyers speak a different and more exotic language than 
ordinary people, part of the lawyerly role in this situation being to act as translator. Lawyers 
also offer a related translation service, from recondite complexity to simplicity, if and when 
there are areas of law that are intellectually very difficult. Difficulty could arise from volume, 
in the sense that some areas of law may be “bittier” than others, such as when, for instance, 
there are numerous overlapping sources of law (cases, statutes, statutory instruments, and 
supra-national rules), all of which have to be regularly and consistently combined. Or it may 
arise just because the concepts and ideas in play are hard to understand (although there is no 
obvious means by which we could assess the latter).  
Another reason why complexity marks legal knowledge concerns the process of 
integrating current legal developments into the narrative of existing and past law. Newly 
decided cases rarely make the pre-existing cases in that area of law redundant; similarly, new 
statute law does not often eradicate the pre-existing law in some area and start completely 
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anew with a clean slate.
11
 Almost all  current legal developments are cognisant of the law that 
has gone before and usually re-evaluate some aspects of that law. The animating idea is that 
the law as a whole, as well as its particular doctrinal departments, is, or should strive to be, a 
coherent system. One aspect of legal complexity thus arises from this aspiration, since the job 
of integrating current legal developments into the narrative of recent and more ancient legal 
history is not always straightforward. That seems particularly likely with regard to areas of 
law that are voluminously “bitty” in the sense noted in the previous paragraph.  
Before turning to the third component of access to justice, note also that none of these 
causes of legal complexity, nor the rationale they provide for legal expertise, are themselves 
necessary. By this I mean that there is nothing obvious about either legal systems in general, 
or the idea of law itself, that means that they, and it, must be complicated (or esoteric or 
recondite). Law and legal systems can surely be simple, complex, or some combination of the 
two, yet those of us who live in complex legal systems should not assume that this is a 
necessary or normal state for all law and legal systems. Levels of legal complexity are surely 
related to levels of social, economic, and cultural complexity, but the link or links here are 
themselves seemingly complex.
12
 For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that legal 
complexity makes access to legal expertise necessary. This second component of access to 
justice is labelled the “legal expertise (or LE) component.”  
The third component of access to justice is access to those bodies – courts and related 
institutional forms – that constitute the primary dispute resolution fora of most justice 
systems. Besides explicitly discriminatory provisions (“whites only”), the most obvious way 
in which access to courts and cognate institutions can be limited is via charges for use. 
Modest charges are unlikely to cause difficulty, provided “modest” is determined by 
reference to factors such as average levels of income and wealth in the society in question. 
Yet such charges must also, if they are not to exclude the worst-off from accessing the court 
system, be constructed so as to be sensitive to cases of specific hardship.
13
 Those unable to 
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afford modest court fees must not be excluded from the court system, at least not if the justice 
system is indeed open to all. However, the issue of payment for the use of courts raises an 
important question – namely, why are such charges imposed and thought appropriate? If legal 
systems with dispute resolution structures like courts and related institutional forms are 
indeed impure public goods, as some economists and social choice theorists claim, then the 
imposition of a full-cost recovery regime upon litigants in some jurisdictions is obviously 
problematic.
14
 Such a regime in effect transforms an impure public good into a private good. 
Modest court fees do not have such a radical effect and might be justified, for example, as a 
means of deterring precipitate recourse to the courts. This third component of access to 
justice is dubbed the “legal fora (or LF) component.”  
For current purposes, “access” in “access to justice” bears its ordinary meaning. 
Access is therefore a matter of degree: it can be difficult, easy, or anything in between. 
Moreover, the degree of access to the three components of access to justice might differ 
according to the component in question. We could imagine legal systems in which legal 
knowledge is easily accessible and non-technical, while the court system is almost useless 
because of cost and/or inefficiency, for example. Equally, we could conceive of a justice 
system in which the courts were cheap, quick, and efficient but in which litigation was rare 
because few, if any, members of the population had knowledge of, or recourse to, law. Of the 
three components of access to justice, the LK component is least likely to be constrained by 
considerations of cost or scarcity, provided the labour involved in publishing laws is not 
onerous. Given the importance of publicity to the rule-of-law ideal – non-publication means 
the law cannot guide conduct – those labour costs would have to be very high indeed to 
incline against publication. Access to the court system and access to legal expertise look, by 
contrast, like options likely to be foreclosed or reduced by scarcity and related considerations. 
A shortage of lawyers would greatly affect the availability of both, as would a lack of funding 
(however sourced and however distributed). The latter point reminds us of the near ubiquity 
of time and money in any attempt to measure the “costs” of access to justice: the time 
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involved is both that of the users and operators of the justice system; the money that of the 
users and of those that pay the system’s operators (which need not be two different classes).  
What can be said in favour of this broad conception of access to justice? Its expansive 
nature ensures that it captures much of what is spoken about when access to justice is 
discussed. It also reminds us of the notion’s relative complexity.15 It concerns not just access 
to institutions (the LF component) but also access to expertise (the LE component) and to 
legal knowledge itself (the LK component), and these are plainly not the same. These three 
components do not raise exactly the same issues when we consider the relative availability of 
each; we could also expect to have different levels of access with regard to each. The fact that 
the LK component has some cost implications blocks the assumption that access to justice is 
entirely a matter of meeting the cost of legal advice and representation (an assumption often 
behind the glib recourse in this context to “legal aid” as a synonym for “access to justice”). 
Understood as a scheme of assisted payment for such advice and representation, legal aid is 
therefore only one element of our broad conception of access to justice. Is there anything 
significant in the discourse of access to justice that the broad conception misses?  
It might be suggested that the right to a fair trial must be included within any plausible 
conception of access to justice, but this is a step too far. Although in some forms – Article 6 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, for example – this right includes access to 
legal advice and representation, it mainly concerns how the law is, and ought to be, applied 
within legal proceedings.
16
 The right to a fair trial thus keeps company with notions of 
(judicial) impartiality, rationality, and role morality. Access to justice, as its name implies, 
engages largely, but not exclusively, with matters prior to the adjudication of disputes by 
courts and related bodies. Separating the two aids clarity, showing that the issues each 
addresses are, though related, significantly different. 
While the right to a fair trial must be distinguished from access to justice, it has been 
suggested that the right to participate in the law reform process should not. It might therefore 
be inferred that any conception that fails to include it – as the broad conception does – must 
be unsatisfactory.
17
 The importance of this right in any democratic society is undeniable. It 
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Genn, supra note 6; Consortium on Legal Services and the Public, Legal Needs and Civil Justice: A Survey of 
Americans (Chicago: American Bar Association, 1994) at 8, online: 
<http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/legalneedstudy.authche
ckdam.pdf>. 
16
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950, 213 UNTS 221 [ECHR]. 
17
 See Coumarelos et al, supra note 15 at iii. 
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can be understood as an obvious complement to the most basic democratic right – namely, 
the entitlement to vote on significant collective decisions. In a society in which democracy is 
reasonably deeply embedded, this entitlement will have local and national manifestations, 
while also being supplemented by a range of consultation processes. Thus, citizens of 
democracies not only have the right to vote in general elections for representatives, but they 
are also entitled to be consulted about local government planning and school decisions, for 
example. These opportunities for citizen input are not exactly the same as formal voting 
processes, but they bespeak a commitment to community involvement in public decision 
making that is an important feature of genuine participatory democracy, where more is 
demanded of, and expected by, citizens than simply voting for a representative every few 
years.
18
 And, just as school boards in many democracies consult about, for example, the 
proposed rebuilding or extension of a particular school, so too do law reform commissions 
and the like consult about prospective changes to the law.
19
 Such consultations are important, 
but their importance is not a function of some or other understanding of access to justice. 
Rather, they are a consequence of any attempt to make participatory democracy real within 
populous and complex contemporary nation-states. Democracy is the animating value here, 
not access to justice. 
With respect to justice, it might be said that this notion is missing from the broad 
conception of access to justice. The limitation upon our concern highlighted above – our 
interest is in the “justice” supposedly dispensed by the various systems of civil, family, and 
criminal justice constitutive of contemporary legal systems – might be criticized as harmful. 
The harm arises from postponing talk about the genuine nature of justice, this serving either 
to represent the law as a justice-free zone or to obscure the role that conceptions of justice 
might play in upholding or undermining the distribution of entitlements found in all existing 
legal systems.
20
 Yet there are two reasons why those interested in access to justice feel 
entitled to run the risk of this harm. First, explicitly noting the risk serves to reduce its danger 
– we can bracket the topic of justice without thereby undermining or denying its significance. 
                                                          
18
 A classic introduction to these issues is Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970). 
19
 In the United Kingdom, the Law Commission for England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission do 
not have a legal duty to consult, although both do. See Law Commissions Act 1965, 1965, c 22; see Law 
Commission, online: <http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/about/how-we-work/> and Scottish Law Commission, online: 
<http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/about-us/#whatwedo>.  
20
 Thus, “[t]he liberal theory of justice is seen neither as a cause of substantive injustice, nor, surprisingly, even 
as an important contributor to its rectification.” Macdonald, supra note 7 at 292. 
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Second, having done that, we can point out that the topic of justice and its various 
components is sufficiently complicated as to merit sustained separate attention. 
 
II. ACCESS TO JUSTICE: WHY? 
 
A. Preliminaries 
 
The “why?” here is a shorthand way of expressing this question: what is the normative 
standing – I have sometimes also said “value” – of access to justice? By “normative 
standing” I mean the ways, if any, in which access to justice and its three components might 
be supported or even required by some or other value or set of values. In saying this, I do not 
hold that all values are moral and political values but, rather, affirm that all values qua values 
have some real or apparent normative weight. The values in play could be what we would 
dub “first-order” values like liberty, equality, autonomy, justice, and the like, or they could be 
“second-order” values, related to first-order values but either not strictly implied by such 
values or derivable from a number of such values. Efficiency and utility are plausibly 
regarded as second-order values, if we accept that neither is good in and of itself, as are 
notions like fairness and reasonableness, which usually depend for their content upon first 
order values and various institutionally or conventionally embedded standards and 
expectations. Hence, what we regard as fairness in the distribution of health care may be 
quite different to fairness in the playing of particular sports. Second-order values are 
intermediate normative notions, occupying the space between first-order values, on the one 
hand, and their real world application and realization, on the other.  
Other notions, which can be labelled value cluster concepts, might also be in play in 
the exploration of the normative standing of some or other entitlement, institution, 
arrangement, or practice.
21
 These are closely related to first- and second-order values in that 
the realization or implementation of a value cluster concept serves also to realize a number of 
first- and/or second-order values. “Democracy” and “the rule of law” are obvious candidates 
for the role of value cluster concepts, since the realization and value of both is not reducible 
to any single value; rather, both seem to protect and advance multiple other values.  
                                                          
21
 For an introduction to cluster concepts, see KP Parsons, “Three Concepts of Clusters’ (1973) 33 Philosophy & 
Phenomenological Research 514; in Parson’s terms, value cluster concepts are most similar to “law cluster 
terms’ (at 518–519). See also Berys Gaut, “‘Art’ as a Cluster Concept” in Noel Carroll, ed, Theories of Art 
Today (Madison: University of Wisconsin, Press 2000) 25. 
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Our task, then, is to determine which values, conceived in this way, might support 
access to justice. It is tempting to follow current usage and regard this search as one of 
supporting or grounding a “right” to access to justice, but the term used here is 
“entitlement.”22 That is because the latter refers to a broader class than the former, including 
all realizable normative claims and interests. Of all of our realizable normative claims and 
interests, some might be particularly important and, thus, characterized as rights, as having 
pre-emptory normative force. But whether or not an entitlement to access to justice belongs 
within the subclass of rights or “merely” within the broader class of entitlements should, in 
the absence of prior argument, be an open question. It is regarded as such here, a 
consequence being that no assumptions are made as to the exact place this entitlement should 
occupy within our overall scheme of value. Rights talk, by contrast, places all entitlements 
that are rights at the apex of that scheme, regarding the entitlement in question as being of 
overriding importance – another’s right is something with which no one should interfere 
(without consent, at least).
23
  
Two further points about the entitlement to access to justice must be noted. The first is 
that this entitlement might be normatively over-determined. It could therefore be supported 
by, or an entailment of, a number of ostensibly quite different normative arguments. The 
second point is a reminder. Bear in mind that, although what follows speaks most often in the 
singular with regard to this entitlement, it is clearly not univocal. That follows from the 
simple truth that access to justice has three components: the macro-level entitlement to “it” is 
therefore three separate micro-entitlements, and we must not lose sight of the two 
possibilities that this presents. One is that the three entitlements may differ in status, not 
being of equal importance. And the second is that, in examining the normative standing of 
access to justice, the normative case could differ from one micro-entitlement to another. 
Nevertheless, I assume from this point on that the best kind of account of the value of access 
to justice is one that fits its three components in this double sense: it shows the value of each 
of them and holds that the value of each is the same. I adopt this default position – henceforth 
labelled “the range assumption” – in the belief that an account of the value of access to 
justice that takes this form is virtuously general, showing the wholesale value of all three 
components. Clearly, there is no guarantee that any particular account of the value of access 
to justice will satisfy the range assumption, nor will failure to satisfy it discredit completely 
                                                          
22
 Two instances of current usage from very different contexts are: Trebilcock et al, supra note 2 at 1; Francesco 
Franconi, ed, Access to Justice as a Human Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 1. 
23
 A still pertinent examination of the foibles of rights talk and rights infatuation is MA Glendon, Rights Talk 
(New York: Free Press, 1991).  
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any such account. The range assumption is accompanied in what follows by another, closely 
related “determinacy assumption.” This holds that the best kind of account of the value of 
access to justice must offer not only arguments that accommodate all of its components; such 
accounts must also have genuinely compelling (or determinate) normative power.  
Finally, there is an objection. The task of examining the normative standing of access 
to justice could be regarded as academic in the pejorative sense. Since some of the 
components of access to justice are already embodied in various legal requirements in 
numerous jurisdictions, the question of the entitlement’s normative standing is surely 
irrelevant. It is already protected and, presumably, this is the result of it being normatively 
significant. Of these two points, the first seems absolutely undeniable: some aspects of some 
of the components of access to justice are embodied in various laws and related provisions. 
However, the level of protection each component (or aspect thereof) receives often differs as 
between criminal and non-criminal trials; it is also true that there is no common law 
jurisdiction in which all three components are fully protected. Since the degree to which the 
entitlement is embedded within and across legal systems is therefore patchy, it is surely not 
“merely” academic to consider how this situation might be justified. The second point also 
seems plausible, but it can be accepted only with a caveat. While it appears sensible to 
presume that entitlements do not become embodied in the law without good (potentially 
normative) reasons, this presumption must be rebuttable because of what we know about law 
creation in legislatures and related bodies. What we know is that there are often many more 
forces at work in that process than the dictates of sound normative reason. Not only are such 
bodies subject to intense lobbying, but they are also prone to downright blunders.
24
 This 
mortifying possibility provides a clear rationale for an examination of the normative basis of 
all areas of statute and like law, not just those bits that deal with access to justice. 
  
B. Access to Justice: Bulwark against Arbitrary Power? 
 
[N]on-domination ... represents a control that a person enjoys in relation to their 
own destiny and such control constitutes one familiar type of power: the power of 
the agent who can prevent various ills happening to them.
25
 
 
                                                          
24
 See Anthony King & Ivor Crewe, The Blunders of Our Governments (London: Oneworld, 2013) for 
numerous salutary reminders.  
25
 Philip Pettit, Republicanism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) at 69 [Pettit, Republicanism]. 
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What is arbitrary power? How, if at all, might the denial of access to justice place one in its 
path? Consider three obvious and not completely hypothetical denials of access to justice. 
These examples present a test for the argument from non-domination but take hypothetical 
form so as to avoid jurisdictional specificities. If the argument cannot handle these examples, 
then it is unlikely to illuminate any actual access-to-justice provisions in existing legal 
systems. If it can, then we have a general account of what makes denials of access to justice 
wrong that could be brought to bear upon particular access-to-justice provisions.  
 
1. M is apprehended by agents of the immigration authority in an airport in a foreign 
country during his journey home. Instead of allowing M to pass through the airport and 
board his flight, the authorities detain M, allow him only perfunctory access to a lawyer, 
and then deport him to a third country. Agents of the immigration authority only 
attempted to contact M’s lawyer a short time before deporting him, having until the time 
of deportation told M’s lawyer and representatives of his government that he would be 
held in the usual immigration detention facility. Call this the “Arar” scenario. It is an 
obvious denial of access to justice, specifically of the LK and LE components, insofar as 
the immigration authority took no genuine steps (1) to convey information to M, or allow 
M access to information, about his legal rights and duties in that country or (2) to ensure 
M had meaningful access to legal advice and representation.
26
  
2. N, like many other low paid workers, entered into a contract with a last minute payday 
loan company – W – and is in debt to the company. Worried by N’s default, or the chance 
of default, W sent N and many other customers a letter that purported to be from W’s 
lawyers. The letter reminded N of the consequences of default, told her that debt recovery 
proceedings had been, or will be, initiated, and that this process was a costly one; more 
costly, by far, than repaying the debt. The letter was not from W’s lawyers at all but was 
created by W in an effort “to maximise ... collections by unfairly increasing pressure on 
customers.”27 N lives in a society with a reasonably complex legal system in which access 
                                                          
26
 See “Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations,” online: 
<http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/cm_arar_rec-eng.pdf>; D Cole, “Getting Away with Torture,” online: 
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to legal advice costs much more than N can afford. All of the neighbourhood law centres 
that existed in N’s country, which were funded by central and local government, were 
closed in 2009. Call this the “Wonga” scenario. It is also an obvious denial of the LK and 
LE components of access to justice. 
3. S, sometimes a low-paid bar worker and sometimes dependent upon income support, is a 
member of a political group that published ostensibly defamatory material about a large 
multi-national corporation. The corporation is pursuing a libel action against S, claiming 
damages of £100,000. S cannot afford legal advice and representation to defend this claim 
and lives in a jurisdiction that denies legal aid for libel actions. S represents herself in the 
legal action but is hampered by the fact that she cannot afford to pay daily charges for 
transcripts of trail proceedings (£750) nor pay for expert evidence and related trial costs. 
Although S has access to the courts in her jurisdiction, it is access of the hollowest kind: 
she can represent herself but not adequately because of transcript and related costs. This 
situation – call it the “Steel” scenario – is for that reason alone a clear denial of the LF 
component of access to justice; it also undermines this component on another ground – 
namely, by putting legal action for libel beyond the range of all but the wealthy.
28
  
 
Are these three denials of access to justice also instances of subjection to arbitrary power? 
Philip Pettit, one of the leading contemporary civic republicans, has done much not just to 
unpack this notion in general terms but also to elucidate the conception of liberty upon which 
it rests. He calls this conception “liberty (or freedom) as non-domination” and defines non-
domination by reference to arbitrary or dominating power, its antonyms: “One agent 
dominates another if and only if they have a certain power over that other, in particular a 
power of interference on an arbitrary basis.”29 As to the latter, “[a]n act is perpetrated on an 
arbitrary basis ... if it is subject just to the arbitrium, the decision or judgement, of the agent; 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
<http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jun/26/wonga-fake-legal-letters-passed-police>. <please provide 
author, title and date as well as the URL> 
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 The scenario derives from Steel and Morris v UK, [2005] 41 EHRR 22 [Steel and Morris]. 
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and Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 102<first page of chapter?> [Pettit, 
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the agent was in a position to choose it or not choose it, at their pleasure.”30 Furthermore, 
when we say this, we imply, because interference with others is involved, that the act in 
question “is chosen or rejected without reference to the interests, or the opinions, of those 
affected. The choice is not forced to track what the interests of those others require according 
to their own judgements.”31 On this view, an act of interference “will be non-arbitrary to the 
extent that it is forced to track the interests and ideas of the person suffering the 
interference.”32  
Interference, for Pettit, includes both actual interference – in the form of physical 
coercion, manipulation of choice situations (including the range of options available, their 
payoffs, and their costs), and control of information – as well as the capacity for interference. 
Dominating or arbitrary power need not always be utilized in order to exist; the realistic 
ability to exercise such power is enough. An unexercised capacity to wield arbitrary power 
does not, unlike our unexercised ability to play piano, undermine the capacity itself. It 
follows from this that, for Pettit and other contemporary republicans, domination can exist 
without actual interference.
33
 A dominates, or has arbitrary (or alien) power over, B by virtue 
of having the ability to brandish that power. For interference to count as such, it must, if 
actual, make matters worse for the party interfered with or, if a capacity to interfere, be the 
power to make matters worse.
34
 There is, for Pettit, no absolute baseline against which 
“worse” and “better” are assessed, there being different baselines in different contexts.35 He 
is keen to emphasize, though, that these baselines are not necessarily always moral. Key 
components of the republican conception of freedom, including what interference and 
arbitrariness look like, are not, he claims, “essentially value-laden” or “moralized.”36 Neither 
the range nor intensity of interference need be absolute. Interference, or the capacity to 
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interfere, can exist with regard to only one small area of an agent’s conduct (you, for 
example, can dictate what I must eat for dinner) or whole tracts of conduct (when, for 
instance, I am your slave).
37
 Interference can differ in intensity insofar as its deployment is 
more or less easy and its effects are more or less powerful; those effects must, of course, have 
some power in order to count as interference.
38
  
The three key components of domination, therefore, are (1) actual adverse 
interference or the capacity for such; (2) on an arbitrary basis; and (3) in some or all aspects 
of the conduct or choices available to others. That is the target against which the republican 
conception of freedom is aimed. But what, precisely, is wrong with arbitrary power and why 
should we strive to eradicate it? Although it might seem silly to pose this question, raising it 
allows us to clarify exactly what republicans value. Moreover, we can do that without 
unpacking all of the principal themes of the republican political program, including its 
models of justice, democracy, citizenship, and its conception of the good life.
39
 A truncated 
account of what republicans value can be constructed from two elements of Pettit’s thought 
that might mistakenly be regarded as trivial but that are actually crucial.  
One element arises from Pettit’s sketch of the reality of living with arbitrary power 
and with non-domination. A social context in which the flows of information and public 
knowledge are much like our own, and in which we can know more or less exactly what we 
currently know about one another’s social, personal, and political lives, is one in which the 
existence of domination and non-domination will be common knowledge. Hence, domination 
is “generally going to involve the awareness of control on the part of the powerful ... [and] 
the awareness of vulnerability on the part of the powerless.” As a result, “the powerless are 
not going to be able to look the powerful in the eye, conscious as each will be ... of this 
asymmetry.”40 By contrast,  
 
the enjoyment of non-domination in relation to another agent – at least when that 
agent is a person – goes with being able to look the other in the eye, confident in 
the shared knowledge that it is not by their leave that you pursue your innocent, 
non-interfering choices; you pursue those choices as of publicly recognised right. 
You do not have to live either in fear of that other, then, or in deference to them. 
The non-interference you enjoy at the hands of others is not enjoyed by their 
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grace and you do not live at their mercy. You are a somebody in relation to them, 
not a nobody. You are a person in your own legal and social right.
41
  
 
This “eyeball test,” which could be taken as little more than a bon mot, actually constitutes a 
picture of community, a mode of belonging in which all in a polity have the same standing 
and value: it entails that everyone is a person in their own right.
42
 Contemporary republicans 
thus value that kind of society and the forms of political community consistent with it. 
The second element, which might be regarded as a trite list of pros and cons, is found 
in Pettit’s characterization of non-domination as a personal, instrumental good. Highlighting 
the virtues of this good is, in large part, a matter of illuminating the vices of subjection to 
arbitrary power. Pettit notes three such vices and corresponding virtues. In the positive 
register, the virtues consist of three freedoms. Non-domination promises, first, not just 
freedom from interference but also  
 
from uncertainty, and from the associated anxiety and inability to plan; [second, 
freedom] from the need to exercise strategy with the powerful, having to defer to 
them and anticipate their various moves; and [third, freedom] from the 
subordination that goes with a common awareness that the person is exposed to 
the possibility of arbitrary interference by another.
43
  
 
Living one’s life in a polity marked by these freedoms is surely better, in multiple respects, 
than living in one in which uncertainty, deference, and subordination hold sway. One’s life in 
a polity of the former kind can be fulsomely committed to one’s goals and, as a result, more 
authentic, in the sense that one’s life plan is truly of one’s own making. That, at least, is the 
way of living on offer under a regime of republican freedom, and it is either foreclosed or 
under constant threat in a regime of arbitrary power.  
With this sketch of republican freedom in mind, we can turn to our three 
hypotheticals. Are these denials of access to justice also instances of domination – arbitrary 
interferences with the conduct or choices of others? In the Arar scenario, the interference is 
both physical and manipulative. M was apprehended and detained by agents of the 
immigration authority and then held in a secure detention centre. He was subsequently taken 
                                                          
41
 Ibid at 71. 
42
 Pettit, On the People’s Terms, supra note 29 at 84.  
43
 Pettit, Republicanism, supra note 25 at 89. 
19 
 
to an airport, placed on an aircraft under guard, and delivered to the security services of 
another state. After that, he was imprisoned and tortured by agents of that state’s security and 
prison services. It is clear that absolutely none of these physical interferences were carried 
out at M’s bidding or with any attention at all to his avowable interests and ideas. Those who 
apprehended M and held him did what they wished with him: he was at their mercy, treated 
by them as if he was a nobody. He was not regarded, and plainly not treated, as a person in 
his own legal and social right. 
That much is also obvious from the way in which the authorities dealt with M’s 
lawyer. In making no effort to inform M of his legal standing, and no genuine effort to inform 
his lawyer as to his whereabouts and what they intended to do with him, they announced their 
lack of interest in M’s standing and views. M was already in their physical power, subject to 
their dominion; providing him with no information and making no genuine effort to contact 
his legal representative were simply additional manifestations of that dominion. Thwarting 
communication with M’s lawyer was a means of ensuring that M had no information about 
his choices, closing off all options to him except those that the authorities chose to take. This 
manipulative interference might seem trivial in comparison to the physical control the 
authorities exercised over M, but it stands as a significant testament both to their dominion 
and to their flimsy regard for legality. There can, of course, be no question that both the 
physical and manipulative inferences with M made him worse off. At the time he was 
apprehended, he was a man destined to return home to family and friends in a matter of 
hours; as a result of the interferences, he was imprisoned and tortured for 374 days, returning 
home more than one year later than he had hoped.  
Unlike Arar, the Wonga scenario is not one in which the potential sources of 
interference are a matter of physical control. The fake letters, as the regulator noted, were 
efforts to bring pressure to bear upon debtors, a means of “changing the range of options 
available [to them], by altering the expected payoffs assigned to those options.”44 The two 
most salient options were: (1) continue with the payments as required under the debt 
agreement or (2) default (or continue to default) and re-structure the debt via a new contract. 
The letters were attempts to circumvent the latter, principally by altering the pay-offs and 
costs that this option bore. Under normal circumstances, they would be the costs of entering 
into a new contract with the lender, with new repayment and interest terms, which would 
presumably be more beneficial (in terms of period but not in the amount of repayment) to the 
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borrower. The letters purported to increase the costs of this option by claiming that legal 
action to secure repayment of the debt had begun, or was about to begin, and that this process 
was itself costly. This threat of imposing extra costs over and beyond those associated with 
the repayment of the original debt was, of course, the instrument of pressure and clearly 
counts as interference in Pettit’s terms. Was it also an arbitrary interference with the debtors, 
and did it make matters worse for them?  
Taking the second part of the question first, it might be answered in the negative. The 
thought here is that if the debtors did indeed discharge their debts, either on time or before the 
commencement of legal action, then that would surely be to their benefit. Of course, the 
“surely” in this sentence bears much weight. For it might have been the case that some of 
those people who received fake letters were willing and able to discharge the debt at the time 
of receipt. But it is also likely – perhaps even more likely – that many recipients of these 
letters were unable do so. Their circumstances, after all, were such that they had entered into 
contracts with a lender that, on any general market measure, were extremely 
disadvantageous, the reason for doing so presumably being a combination of serious financial 
need and the unavailability of other sources of credit.  
This response also serves as a reply to the first part of the question. If we assume that 
many recipients of the fake letters were unable to repay their debts at the time of receipt, then 
it is difficult to show that the interference the letters represented was in the interest of those 
debtors. This appearance of arbitrariness – of being a product of the lender’s whim or 
dominion and of their disregard for their debtors’ interests – is further reinforced by the 
deception deployed, for if there were good legal grounds for sending the letters, then why 
were they sent in the names of fake law firms? In a context in which legal knowledge and 
advice is (in all senses) easily available, a deceptive ruse like this would be pointless – a visit 
to one’s neighbourhood law centre would quickly resolve the issue. The fact that, on our 
version of the Wonga scenario, no such access to legal knowledge and advice existed, adds to 
the power of the interference and reminds us that one way in which domination can be 
countered is via social and constitutional arrangements that ensure “reciprocal power.”45 That 
is a strategy of making “resources of dominator and dominated more equal so that, ideally, a 
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previously dominated person can come to defend themselves against any interference on the 
part of the dominator.”46 Some of the relevant resources in this instance would be legal 
knowledge and advice.  
This point highlights another potential source of, or aid to, interference and 
domination, namely the closure of legal advice centres in N’s jurisdiction. Does local and 
central government withdrawal of financial support for those centres constitute an 
interference with N that worsens her situation? And, if so, is that interference arbitrary? The 
move from a situation in which legal advice is freely and easily available to N to one in 
which it is available only to those who can pay is surely a worsening of N’s situation if she 
cannot afford legal advice. This could only be denied if it were true that having access to 
legal knowledge and expertise was in some general sense harmful for N or those in N’s 
position. That is surely never the case, even when the law stands against one. For, although 
the legal consequences one faces in that situation are adverse, is it not better to know that 
than to remain in ignorance? The latter is bliss only when harm never follows.  
This worsening of N’s situation is also an interference since it forecloses an option 
previously available to N. Its arbitrariness depends upon the basis of the decision. Since this 
decision constitutes a potential interference by government with citizen – an exercise of 
imperium rather than dominium – the test is slightly different from that required when the 
interference is by citizen on citizen.
47
 In the latter case, the decision and interference it 
warrants has to match up with the avowable interests of the interferee. In the former case, the 
decision and interference must match up with the common avowable interests of the citizenry 
as a whole. Of course, there might be an overlap here: if it could be shown that the closure of 
legal advice centres was undoubtedly a necessary result of a policy of financial austerity, 
itself assuredly required for the economic well-being of N’s society, then it could be argued 
that the decision was in N’s avowable interests and in her and all other citizens’ common 
avowable interests. An interference that is required to, and does indeed, track the interests of 
those affected by it in either of these two ways is not arbitrary.
48
 A decision formulated and 
implemented without regard to the interests of those whom it adversely affects is halfway to 
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being arbitrary. The remaining half of the journey requires that the decision be subject only to 
the judgment of the maker, being entirely within his or her dominion.  
There are also two apparent sources of interference in the Steel scenario. My use of 
the word “apparent” is deliberate, a means of highlighting two supposed oddities about each 
source. One source was the initiation and pursuit of legal action, and some might find it odd 
to regard the prosecution of a prima facie valid legal claim as interference. Yet, as Pettit 
makes clear, and as is perhaps only a little less obvious from our discussion of Wonga, where 
the lender was legally entitled to remind debtors of their obligations, conduct does not cease 
to count as interference because it is morally (and possibly legally) legitimate.
49
 If the fake 
letters in Wonga amounted to arbitrary interference, then must the initiation and pursuit of 
legal action also count as such? Not necessarily. For, although (1) the threat of legal action is 
undoubtedly a means of both closing down some options previously available to the 
interferee and changing the pay-offs associated with others and (2) is available at the whim of 
a sufficiently wealthy interferor, it can be countered by the easy availability of expert legal 
advice to the interferee.
50
 The same is true of the actual pursuit of legal action, which, unlike 
the “mere” threat of it, is in most familiar legal systems backed up by the coercive power of 
the justice system to compel attendance at court, punish contempt, and so on. Resources of 
would-be dominator and dominatee are thereby brought closer to equality, achieving what the 
European Court of Human Rights calls “equality of arms” both before and during a trial.51 
There is no such equality of arms in the Steel scenario nor was there in the actual case. Not 
only did S have to represent herself in court and rely upon lawyers acting pro bono, while the 
multinational corporation had several senior and junior lawyers available, she was also 
hampered by being unable to meet the costs for transcripts of proceedings and other matters.  
The second potential source of interference in the Steel scenario is that of the abolition 
of legal aid for defamation, and it need not detain us long.
52
 Can a political decision such as 
this, enacted by the government of the day, be an instance of arbitrary interference? The issue 
                                                          
49
 Pettit, Republicanism, supra note 25 at 54. 
50
 Although there are professional ethical constraints upon lawyers when advising clients about the efficacy of 
legal action, it seems that sufficiently wealthy clients can insist on pursuing action regardless. See Simon 
Godley, “Judge Attacks Mike Ashley for Abusing Legal System Against Rangers Boss,” The Guardian (22 
January 2016), online: <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jan/22/judge-attacks-mike-ashley-for-
abusing-legal-system-against-rangers-boss> <provide authors, titles and dates for these URLs>. 
51
 Steel and Morris, supra note 28, para 59 (para 69 notes the obvious disparity in level of legal expertise and 
help as between the parties in the actual case: “[I]t could not have failed, in this exceptionally demanding case, 
to have given rise to unfairness”). See also ECtHR, De Haes and Gijsels v Belgium, Appl no 19983/92 (24 
February 1997); ECtHR, Case of Bulut v Austria, Appl no 17358/90 (22 February 1996). 
52
 This was done, in England and Wales, by the Access to Justice Act 1999, 1999, c 22, s 6(6), Schedule 2. Legal 
action for defamation can now only be funded by one’s own money or via conditional fee agreements with 
lawyers.  
23 
 
here is exactly the same as that in play in the withdrawal of financial support for legal advice 
centres in the Wonga scenario. If the decision to abolish legal aid for defamation actions 
adhered to the same constraints – it was required to, and did indeed, track the common 
avowable interests of the citizenry affected by it – then it will not be arbitrary.  
Pettit’s picture of arbitrary power and non-domination seemingly makes good 
normative sense of our token denials of access to justice. It throws light on what is wrong in 
these cases. However, it cannot tell us what is wrong with every denial of access to justice, 
since not all such denials are necessarily instances of domination – arbitrary interferences in 
the conduct or choices of another. As just noted, a political decision to stop legal aid for 
certain proceedings, leaving nothing in its place but the possibility of conditional fee 
agreements, could in some circumstances represent both the avowed interests of prospective 
litigants and those of all other members of the polity. If it did, it would not be arbitrary in the 
republican sense. However, many denials of access to justice – making legal information hard 
to obtain, preventing access to legal advice and representation, imposing very high court and 
related costs – are straightforward exercises of arbitrary power. Is that worth knowing? Some 
may doubt it.  
One reason for doubt is that the alleged wrong of being subject to domination is either 
insufficiently serious to count as a genuine harm or too expansive to be helpful, dubbing most 
instances of influence instances of domination. In doubting the seriousness of the alleged 
wrong, the first limb of this complaint questions the harm that the threat, or the actual 
initiation, of legal action represents. At least, that is the way in which it is interpreted here 
for, although it could be taken as an objection to the republican conception of domination, I 
regard that as the crux of the second limb of this complaint. Proponents of the first limb must, 
then, regard legal action or its threat as being so untroubling as to be unable to count as 
domination. Those who have feared legal action more than death and taxes are therefore in 
the grip of a mistake.
53
  
Numerous considerations suggest that there is no mistake. There is sound empirical 
evidence to show that those with legal problems find them to be a major source of anxiety 
and stress.
54
 The sheer volume of this research makes it difficult to dismiss the point that 
many of those involved in legal action find it, at the very least, significantly troublesome. 
                                                          
53
 Judge Learned Hand was one such timorous soul. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (London: Fontana, 1986) at 
1.  
54
 See, eg, Ab Currie, “The Legal Problems of Everyday Life” (2009) 12 Sociology of Crime, Law & Deviance 
1 at 9: “Overall, 58.9% of respondents said that the problem had made their day-to-day lives somewhat to 
extremely difficult and 86.7% said that resolving the problem was somewhat to extremely important.” 
24 
 
These findings also remind us that the view that legal action is, in general, a bad thing for 
those on the receiving end, is institutionally embedded in many legal systems.
55
 All the 
common law jurisdictions have torts of abuse of process and malicious prosecution, and 
many legal systems also have related constraints upon frivolous and vexatious litigation.  
These torts differ in both their history and requirements, but part of the rationale for 
both must be that there is a wrong that they aim to prevent and for which they must 
compensate. And, for there to be a wrong, there must usually or generally be harm to 
someone; most obviously here, to the party on the receiving end, the one being dragged, or 
being threatened with being dragged, through the courts. There might be other more general 
or systemic wrongs in play – a worry about clogging the courts with unmeritorious cases 
being one of them – but it is inconceivable that such torts would exist without an agent-
specific harm also being present. That is because all torts have victims in the specific sense of 
one who has suffered as a result of the conduct of another; whatever else they are, torts are 
overwhelmingly bilateral wrongs.
56
 This rationale for these torts – or an element of it – also 
presumably informs the prohibitions in many countries, either in statutory or other form, 
upon particular agents deemed to be vexatious litigants. The very description of the conduct 
here tells us a good deal about the wrong: the victims of these litigants are vexed, harassed, 
subject to “terrorism.”57  
These considerations show that being on the receiving end of legal action is a bad 
thing, a worsening of one’s situation. Our discussion of the Wonga and Steel scenarios shows 
that the threat or pursuit of legal action can also constitute an interference. It is therefore the 
case that bringing or threatening legal action can count, in republican terms, as domination, 
provided that decision is entirely within the power of the initiator. What, then, of the second 
limb of the objection under consideration: is the republican notion of domination too 
expansive? If every instance of influence is also an instance of domination, then the latter 
category surely becomes useless because it includes too much.  
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However, domination, for Pettit, has features that ordinary run-of-the-mill influence 
lacks. It is no exaggeration to say that my nearest and dearest have a good deal of influence 
over me: weekend activities and meal options are often decided after consultation and 
discussion of their desires and needs as well as their views of my desires and needs. 
Changing my choices and plans in light of their views certainly shows that I am subject to 
their influence, yet, as we know, I am only dominated by them if at least two conditions are 
satisfied. First, they must have actual or potential power over me that I lack over them and, 
second, that power must marry with a lack of any duty on their part to consider my avowed 
interests. This double-edged asymmetry goes to the core of domination, and it is absent in 
ordinary cases of influence. Thus, the influence my family has over me is like the influence 
my doctor or life coach wields –- their judgments are good faith attempts to identify and track 
my own interests. Although the warrant for these judgments – familiarity in the one case, 
expertise in the other – is different, both aim to highlight features about my condition that I 
either misunderstand or do not know.  
Even if domination can be distinguished from influence, it might still be maintained 
that the former is too inclusive a notion to be helpful. One reason for thinking so is that, on 
Pettit’s account, domination can exist within the sphere of that which is morally and legally 
permissible. That is true, but should it be thought problematic? It might seem so were we to 
equate domination with illegitimacy of some kind or other, yet Pettit rejects this equation. He 
does so because arbitrariness is not, for him, a moralized notion. While this and related 
claims about non-arbitrariness and domination have been challenged, they are not clearly 
mistaken.
58
 Nor does the fact that there are numerous accounts of domination available, at 
least one of which might be moralized, undermine Pettit’s position.59 At least, it cannot do so 
until such time as either Pettit’s non-moralized account is shown to collapse into that account 
or that account is proved obviously superior to Pettit’s.  
Furthermore, this broad issue obscures a question that the objection under 
consideration must face, regardless of the connection between normative and non-normative 
accounts of domination. It is this: why should we reject an account of domination that accepts 
the possibility of domination within the sphere of the morally and legally permissible? Why 
regard such an account as being too general or too inclusive? The fact that an account of 
domination allows such a possibility can, on the contrary, be considered an advantage. It 
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could illuminate a puzzling feature of legally and morally permissible activity in capitalist 
societies – namely, its tendency to entrench or exacerbate existing inequalities.60 Those 
inequalities – of income and opportunity, of health, and of overall quality of life – are not 
often the direct result of moral or legal wrongs perpetrated by some members of the 
population upon others. Indeed, those inequalities obtain and persist in the face of practices, 
institutions, and conduct that are ostensibly legally and morally permissible. Many in 
contemporary Western societies do legitimate work, pay their taxes, and feed and nurture 
their children, but they are impoverished and, it seems, their children will be impoverished 
into adulthood as well.
61
 How is this possible in a context in which these people are at no 
point the victims of moral and legal wrongs? Pettit’s account of domination provides an 
answer that redounds to its credit.  
The argument from non-domination, then, provides a plausible explanation of the 
wrong involved in some denials of access to justice. As a result, it can also support an 
entitlement to access to justice as a means of avoiding that wrong, the entitlement standing as 
a bulwark against instances of manipulation, deception, and threats to unleash (or actual 
exercises of) power that constitutes domination. These points hold regardless of some of the 
philosophical objections aimed at contemporary republicanism – that it misrepresents the 
liberal tradition, for example, or that its conception of freedom is not ultimately 
distinguishable from negative liberty
62
 – because the non-domination argument is powerful 
regardless of its true intellectual lineage. It is valid whether derived from a republican or a 
liberal background framework. I have presented it here as part of the former because I 
believe, alongside Pettit and other contemporary republicans, that the republican framework 
is genuinely distinguishable from liberal frameworks. I cannot show that here, nor does 
anything in the argument turn upon it. 
Finally, note that the non-domination argument is contingent, holding only for legal 
systems as they currently exist in the common law world – complex systems with limited 
regimes of access to justice. Things could change. Were they to do so in some ways, then the 
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argument would lose its power. It is conceivable, although practically and politically 
unlikely, that legal advice in these systems might come to be provided on the model of free 
on-demand, need-based health care. If that happened, then the space for domination would be 
reduced: Arar and Wonga-type scenarios would be impossible. Free on-demand, need-based 
legal advice supplemented with similarly available legal representation would reduce the 
space for domination further, since Steel-type scenarios would not arise. And free on-
demand, need-based legal advice and representation, combined with easily available legal 
information and free access to courts and tribunals, would shrink the space for domination in 
the legal context to zero.
63
  
  
C. Range and Determinacy  
 
This subsection reinforces the argument from non-domination indirectly by examining two 
arguments – from the rule of law and from equality – often adduced in favour of an 
entitlement to access to justice.
64 
I show that these arguments cannot satisfy the range and 
determinacy assumptions, sketched earlier in section II.A. This is a problem, since those 
assumptions set plausibility conditions that good arguments in support of an entitlement of 
access to justice must satisfy. The argument from non-domination clearly satisfies those 
conditions. 
 
1. Range 
 
The range assumption holds that a good account of the value of access to justice 
accommodates all of its components and regards them as equally valuable. If we keep 
contemporary common law legal systems in mind, then it seems certain that the argument 
from non-domination must accord equal importance to each component of access to justice. 
These legal systems are complex, have patchy access to advice and representation, and 
charge “users” fees for access to courts and impose related costs. For the financially hard 
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pressed – but by no means only those65 – these systems are a rich source of potential 
domination. They can be used as a means of domination by any agent able to incur the costs 
involved, subject only to the professional ethical constraints binding their legal advisers and 
the restrictions upon vexatious litigation. If such agents wish to use the legal system to “grind 
others into dust,” then it seems they can.66 In this context, it would be implausible for the 
non-domination argument to distinguish between different components of access to justice: 
each is equally important.  
We might think that this judgment would change if, for example, it were possible to 
improve access to one, but not all, components. Were that possible, then one who valued 
access to justice would, other things being equal, choose to do that. That choice is not, 
however, a decision to value one component above others; it is a judgment that improvements 
in access to justice, wherever they can be made, are valuable. Our judgment about the equal 
importance of the three components would be challenged only if we were forced to make a 
choice between improving one and degrading others. It would not be unreasonable for one 
committed to access to justice to refuse to make such a choice here and now. If the context 
were different – one, for instance, in which there were no impediments to accessing legal 
knowledge and advice, legal representation, and courts and tribunals – then a choice might be 
made. Departures from “gold-standard” access to justice might be acceptable in some 
circumstances, even to defenders of that entitlement. Much would depend upon what might 
be gained and lost by such a choice. 
Recourse to the rule of law as a means of supporting access to justice or one or other 
of its components is routine. Such recourse, however, is rarely an instance of “argument,” the 
rule of law almost never being shown to generate explicit grounds for access to justice. 
Rather, it is usually simply assumed that an entitlement to access to justice is required by the 
rule of law, presumably in the form of something like a direct entailment.
67
 However, as we 
will see, no such direct and unproblematic entailment exists.  
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The first problem that besets those attempting to establish such a link is that, while 
there are not quite as many conceptions of the rule of law as there are jurists, there are still 
numerous conceptions to choose from.
68
 These conceptions can be placed on a spectrum 
ranging from thin to thick, the former being more, and the latter less, parsimonious in the 
number of desiderata they include as constituting the rule of law. Since space does not allow 
for an examination of all actual and conceivable entries on this spectrum and their 
relationship with access to justice, how might we proceed? I propose two manoeuvres: first, 
an examination of what it is that all conceptions of the rule of law – thick and thin – have in 
common and, second, an elucidation of the general difficulty that all thick conceptions 
present.  
The first manoeuvre might be regarded as folly, for what, if anything, could the great 
variety of conceptions of the rule of law have in common? My answer is: Lon Fuller’s eight 
desiderata, their guiding rationale and constitutive values.
69
 Fuller’s desiderata amount to the 
concept of the rule of law, the argumentative plateau upon which arise all competing 
conceptions of the rule of law. In an arresting metaphor, what guarantees that the latter are 
indeed competing views about the same thing is that they “by and large agree about the most 
general and abstract [rule of law] propositions, ... which form the trunk of … [a] tree, but they 
disagree about more concrete refinements or subinterpretations of these abstract propositions, 
about the branches of the tree.”70 Fuller’s desiderata are the trunk of the tree, the concept of 
the rule of law to which all competing conceptions are connected or relate.
71
 That being so, 
what do those desiderata tell us about access to justice? 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
themselves”; Kevin Lindgren, AM, QC, “The Rule of Law and Some Aspects of the Current Legal Scene in 
Australia” (University of Sydney Law School Distinguished Speakers Program, 18 July 2013), online: 
<http://www.academyoflaw.org.au/publication?id=2>: “The Rule of Law and a strong independent judiciary are 
empty ideals if people cannot access the courts”; Law Society, “Policy Campaigns: Access to Justice and Rule 
of Law,” online: <http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/policy-campaigns/articles/access-to-justice-and-the-rule-of-
law/>: “The rule of law underpins the very foundations of access to justice”; Curran & Noone, supra note 7 at 
84–85: “If people cannot access legal help and assistance to seek remedies or enforce their rights, then their 
participation in society is diminished and the rule of law undermined.”  
68
 A list of all plausible conceptions of the rule of law ideal would be very long. The principal recent sources 
that must feature on any such list are. Fuller, supra note 9; FA Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (London: 
Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1960) part 2; FA Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (London: Routledge, Kegan 
and Paul, 1973) vol 1; HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, revised ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) at 206–207; 
HLA Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) ch 3; Joseph Raz, The 
Authority of Law, 2d ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009) ch 11; NE Simmonds, Law as a Moral Idea (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2007); Jeremy Waldron, “The Concept and the Rule of Law’ (2008) 43 Georgia L Rev 1. 
69
 See Fuller, supra note 9, ch 2, for the desiderata; they are in service of the “enterprise of subjecting human 
conduct to the governance of rules” (at 74, 106, 162), the values informing that enterprise being “dignity,” 
responsibility, and, presumably, autonomy (at 162–167).  
70
 Dworkin, supra note 53 at 70. 
71
 This claim looks like a hostage to fortune, but how could an alleged account of the rule of law eschew Fuller’s 
desiderata and remain an account of the rule of law? 
30 
 
There are eight desiderata: generality (there must be rules), promulgation, non-
retroactivity, clarity, consistency (the law being free of contradictions), possibility (the law-
setting standards with which human beings can comply), stability (or constancy of law over 
time), and congruence between declared law and official conduct. Of these, the two most 
obviously connected to access to justice are the first and second. That a legal system, to 
comply with the rule of law, must have general rules of some kind, and that those rules must 
be promulgated, surely implies that addressees of a legal system can know the demands that 
this system makes upon them and, if those demands are complex, be able to obtain guidance 
about them. The combination of these two desiderata therefore seems to directly entail the 
LK and LE components of access to justice. If the law were practically unknowable, in the 
sense that it was understood only by a taciturn and reticent genius, then both LK and LE 
components would be thwarted, as would either or both of the generality and promulgation 
desiderata. The fact that law has supposedly been created, but communicated only to the 
genius, cannot amount to promulgation in any but a Pickwickian sense, where 
communication to one other being counts as promulgation. And since promulgation is in 
doubt, addressees of this putative legal system must also be in doubt as to whether or not 
there are indeed any general laws or rules applicable to them: they simply cannot be sure until 
such time as the reticent and taciturn genius speaks (if he ever does).  
Are any of Fuller’s other desiderata salient with regard to access to justice? It could 
be suggested that, since all but one of the remaining six are matters of degree, capable of 
realization to a greater or lesser extent, they should or must be testable in the courts. This 
connection, if plausible, provides a normative prop for the LF component. However, the 
implausibility of this suggestion derives not just from Fuller’s view that courts are not a 
necessary element of the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules 
and, hence, not a necessary element of the rule of law.
72
 It also results from the suddenness of 
the move between “matters of degree,” on the one hand, and “must be testable in courts (or 
like institutional forms),” on the other. That the latter simply does not follow, in anything like 
a direct way, from the former is obvious; equally obvious is that the process of derivation 
must be reasonably long and complex since we have many similarly aspirational standards 
that are rightly not testable in courts.  
If our concept of the rule of law cannot support all components of access to justice, 
surely thicker conceptions will fare better? Joseph Raz’s account is one such, including not 
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just Fuller’s eight desiderata but also at least an additional three requirements. One of these is 
that “[t]he courts should be easily accessible.”73 Access to justice – or one component of it – 
is thus built in to this conception of the rule of law. This close connection, alongside the fact 
that the generality and promulgation desiderata of the concept of the rule of law require the 
LK and LE components of access to justice, might explain what we earlier took to be a 
baleful lacuna – namely, the glib invocation of the rule of law as an assumed support for 
access to justice. Since the connections between the two ideas are so close, glibness is 
excusable.  
In Raz’s case, the addition of easy access to the courts as a desideratum of the rule of 
law is questionable. The reason is that the grounds for this addition, as well as some of the 
others he adds to the original eight, are not well specified. The addition therefore looks ad 
hoc. As a general matter, the desiderata of any conception of the rule of law must be justified 
or explained in the same way as one would explain the desiderata of the concept of the rule of 
law: by reference to its point and the value(s) it realizes. All eight of Fuller’s desiderata flow 
from the animating idea of the concept of the rule of law – the enterprise of subjecting human 
conduct to the governance of rules – and the values that this idea upholds or protects: dignity 
and autonomy. However, it is unclear how Raz’s access to the courts desideratum flows from 
this enterprise and those values. We noted that Fuller did not regard courts as a necessary 
condition for engaging in the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of 
rules, and he was surely right about that.
74
 Societies are conceivable that are able to realize 
this enterprise without the need for courts to adjudicate disputes about the rules by which 
they are governed. Disputes may not arise because, for example, members of society are 
angelic and non-disputatious or, more likely, disputes do arise, but members find other ways 
of resolving them. There is no reason to think that the menu of dispute resolution options is 
particularly short. 
This point might be thought misguided because, by ascribing Fuller’s view of the 
point of the rule of law to Raz, it cannot undermine Raz’s case. For Raz’s view of the point of 
the rule of law is quite different to Fuller’s. The problem is that it is not. While not exactly 
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identical to Fuller’s view – Raz holds that “the basic intuition from which ... the rule of law 
derives ... [is that] law must be capable of guiding the behaviour of its subjects”75 – it is 
sufficiently close as to make no difference for the present purpose. If the LF component 
cannot be quickly and easily derived from the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to 
rules, then it seems very unlikely that it can be quickly and easily derived from the enterprise 
of guiding human behaviour. How, then, might Raz show that his access to the courts 
desideratum genuinely follows from, or is part of, the rule-of-law idea? There are two 
possibilities.  
The first holds that this desideratum flows not from the basic idea of the rule of law 
but, rather, from “the particular circumstances of different societies.”76 Such circumstances, 
Raz says, confer “validity or importance” on many of the principles of the rule of law, one of 
which is the access to the courts desideratum.
77
 However, this is an unpromising move. For, 
if this desideratum does not flow from the basic idea of the rule of law, then the fact that it 
might be justified by reference to, or derived from, other “circumstances” matters not. Unless 
those circumstances are either merely surrogates for the rule of law or so tightly connected to 
it as to be entailments, then the connection with the former is, at best, tenuous. This is even 
more evident once one considers what it might be for particular circumstances to be 
“surrogates” for the rule of law or for them to be entailed by the rule of law. Of course, the 
particular circumstances of different societies might make the rule of law idea more or less 
salient: more so in contemporary societies, less so in a society of angels. But this obvious 
truth does nothing, of itself, to show that this idea includes the LF component or that the 
latter follows from it. Whether or not the latter is required by Raz’s conception of the rule of 
law remains an open question.  
However, there is a second possibility that might also answer this question. It holds 
that the access to the courts desideratum derives not from the enterprise and values that 
animate the concept of the rule of law but, rather, from additional values that inform Raz’s 
eleven-desiderata conception of the rule of law. What might these be? There is only one 
candidate. In addition to invoking notions of autonomy and dignity that are almost identical 
to those utilized by Fuller, Raz invokes the idea of individual freedom.
78
 Regarding the 
protection of individual freedom as a virtue of the rule of law, says Raz, “is right in the sense 
of freedom in which it is identified with an effective ability to choose between as many 
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options as possible. Predictability in one’s environment does increase one’s power of 
action[].”79 Since the rule of law is one means of ensuring a reasonable degree of such 
predictability, then “[t]he rule of law may be yet another way of protecting personal 
freedom.”80 Does the rule of law’s protection of freedom support either Raz’s access to the 
courts desideratum or, what amounts to the same thing, the LF component of access to 
justice? 
It might, given the kind of circumstances outlined in the Arar, Wonga, and Steel 
scenarios earlier in this article. Protection against non-domination might also often be the 
protection of a sphere of individual freedom, which does not sound the least bit surprising. 
Yet the question that must be answered is this: What bears the normative weight here,  Raz’s 
conception of the rule of law, or the value that it serves? If it is the latter that really anchors 
the access to the courts desiderata – and that is how things look – then recourse to the rule of 
law idea simply gets in the way. It seems “cleaner” and more direct to argue from the value in 
question to this particular component of access to justice. The rule-of-law idea is a redundant 
intermediary step in this argument.  
This issue is a specific manifestation of a more general difficulty that thick 
conceptions of the rule of law display in this and related contexts. There is an ever-present 
risk with such conceptions that the various additional desiderata they include in the rule-of-
law idea either (1) are not in fact derivable from the core idea of the rule of law or from its 
underpinning values or (2) derive exclusively from the latter and not the former. The previous 
paragraphs have shown that this risk is clearly evident in Raz’s account and, that being so, 
that his conception of the rule of law cannot support each component of access to justice. We 
also noted that the concept of the rule of law, as articulated by Fuller, is similarly limited. 
These arguments do not show that  all conceptions of the rule of law  fail to satisfy the range 
assumption, but they do show that the best account of the concept of the rule of law, and a 
leading conception of the rule of law, fail to satisfy it. These failures bode ill for other 
arguments  from the rule of law.  
 
2. Determinacy 
 
The determinacy assumption holds that the best kind of account of the value of access to 
justice must have a genuinely compelling normative power. The argument from equality 
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cannot satisfy this condition, while the argument from non-domination can. What is the 
argument from equality? There are potentially many such arguments available, the last 
twenty or so years having witnessed an explosion of work on equality by legal and political 
philosophers.
81
 In the access to justice context, however, philosophical accounts of equality 
lurk in the background. The primary focus of equality arguments here is that array of equality 
and non-discrimination provisions found throughout the common law jurisdictions in various 
charters, constitutional documents, and treaties.
82
 Insofar as these provisions guarantee equal 
protection of the laws, or equality before and under the law, then they immediately make 
problematic a situation in which those with funds can obtain access to justice and those 
without cannot. If this situation is not one in which equal protection of the laws is denied, or 
in which the parties do not stand equal before or under the law, then what might such a 
situation look like? This question, and the constitutional and related provisions that trigger it, 
is what I mean by “the argument from equality.”83 Can arguments of this type support an 
entitlement to access to justice?  
There is no reason why, in principle, they cannot. But the juridical statements of 
equality from which such arguments begin are more problematic than is often appreciated, 
principally because they provide little guidance as to the nature of equality and inequality. 
Although some laws, policies, procedures, and forms of conduct are now clearly invalid 
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under these provisions (such as, for example, the enactment of a legal provision explicitly 
favouring Caucasians and disadvantaging non-Caucasians), there are nevertheless many 
instances in which it is hard to be certain.
84
 At least, this is so if we have reference to nothing 
more that the wording of these provisions themselves. Thus, it is simply unclear from the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for example, whether or not 
University of Michigan Law School admission procedures, which in some instances prioritize 
factors in addition to academic merit, deny some citizens equal protection of the laws. It is 
similarly far from obvious whether equivalent broad equality provisions in other jurisdictions 
permit, for instance, differential access to public spaces, schooling, and legal advice or 
differential levels of social security benefits.
85
 In all but the most blatant cases, the courts 
must necessarily go beyond the literal wording of the relevant equality provisions, in part 
because of the distance between these general statements (“every individual is equal before 
and under the law”) and specific legal questions (is it discriminatory for the province of 
Quebec to pay the young unemployed less in benefits than their unemployed elders?). Since 
the words of this and similar equality provisions give little guidance as to how to decide 
particular cases, something more is therefore necessary than recourse to the bare text. What is 
this “more” and, further, what informs the search for it,  gives it traction?  
If the provision in question has been litigated before, then the precedents may provide 
some guidance. So, too, might the legislative history of the provision, but there is no 
guarantee that it will include anything salient. Furthermore, even textual sources like 
precedents and legislative history will rarely rationally compel a particular interpretation of 
an equality provision in a specific case. This is because such additional textual evidence is 
itself usually subject to a process of elaboration or interpretation. Consider, for example, what 
common law appellate courts usually do with precedents cited to them as a guide to the 
meaning of some or other equality provision. Whether or not such precedents are factually 
close, they are usually examined (1) with a view to the light they cast upon the meaning of 
the provision; (2) with a view to the sense they make of adjacent precedents and legal 
provisions; and (3) with a view to their implications in the case at bar and for the future of the 
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area of law in question. Particular precedents might be found satisfactory or unsatisfactory on 
one or more dimensions. This process is clearly anything but automatic, leaving room for 
different judgments about “sense” and “implications” and, thus, never determined solely by 
the precedent(s) cited. If the precedents were indeed determinative in this “self-interpreting” 
way, then the case would not be “hard” and would therefore not be litigated.86  
Moreover, when “the meaning of the provision” is sought, either in precedents or in 
other textual sources, what exactly is being sought? The words of the provision are there in 
the text, so how can its “meaning” reside elsewhere? And when the implications of applying 
a precedent to the case at bar are determined to be either good or bad, how is that judgment 
arrived at? The answer is that the meaning sought, and the basis for judging implications to 
be good, bad, or indifferent, is found, as many lawyers would now say, in “a theory” of the 
provision in question, by which they mean an account of its point, purpose, or value.
87
 The 
process of elaboration in the interpretation of juridical equality provisions is thus one that 
involves both descent, moving from the general provision to the particular case, and ascent, 
moving from the general provision to an account of its point, purpose, or value. Both aspects 
of this process are connected in that “the theory” of the provision indicates the interpretative 
pathways along which to proceed in particular cases. Note, though, that such theories are not 
rightly viewed as being more abstract than the provisions they theorize. Rather, they usually 
serve to make those provisions more specific, both in terms of an account of their point, 
purpose, or value and in terms of what that account requires in particular cases. Such a theory 
gives the provision “depth,” showing us how to go on applying it, and is thus not best 
regarded as being solely abstract.
88
  
The open-ended nature of juridical equality provisions, conjoined with the process of 
elaboration involved when the courts apply them in all but the simplest of cases, warrants two 
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claims. First, that there is no in-principle barrier preventing these provisions providing a 
normatively compelling case for all three components of access to justice. However, the job 
of constructing such a case is neither an easy nor a direct one, the distance from these 
provisions to an entitlement to access to justice being just as far, and just as contestable and 
problematic, as that from such provisions to, for example, a decision about the legitimacy of 
differential welfare payments.  
This point might explain the second claim, which is that these provisions have never 
been successfully invoked to justify a full entitlement to access to justice. This is certainly so 
in two jurisdictions with such provisions, namely Canada and the United States. In Canada, 
section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has played no role in the most 
recent access to justice cases, and some have suggested that the attempt to invoke this 
provision as a base for an entitlement to access to justice is a mistake.
89
 The principal 
problem is that claimants need to show that a particular denial of access to justice was the 
result of treatment on those prohibited (or analogous) grounds noted in the Charter and that 
indigence is not such a ground.
90
 Thus, the elements of an entitlement to access to justice 
protected by Canadian law, like the LF and LE components, are secured not by the equality 
argument but, rather, by reference to other legal provisions, such as section 96 of the 
Constitution Act 1867.
91
 The LK component has, so far as I am aware, received no 
independent attention in cases under section 15(1) of the Charter.  
In the United States, the equal protection clause has not been conspicuously effective 
in supporting an entitlement to access to justice. It has partially upheld the LE component, 
having been invoked to support a limited right to counsel in civil cases, the limitation being 
determined by reference to the importance of the interest at stake.
92
 The position is much the 
same with regard to the LF component, the US Supreme Court having said that court-related 
fees, like those for transcripts, can in some circumstances breach the equal protection 
clause.
93
 As to the LK component, this seems only ever to be addressed insofar as it can be 
subsumed under the LE component. The equal protection clause thus does not support a 
general entitlement to access to justice.  
                                                          
89
 See Trial Lawyers, supra note 13; Hryniak, supra note 67. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 
of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. 
90
 The point belongs to MB Rankin, “Access to Justice and the Institutional Limits of Independent Courts” 
(2012) 30 Windsor YB Acc Just 101 at 110–111; see also Gosselin, supra note 85. 
91
 Constitution Act, 1867, (UK), 30 & 31 Vict. 
92
 See Lassiter, supra note 13; Turner, supra note 13. 
93
 MLB v SLJ, 519 US 102 (1996). 
38 
 
As things stand, the equality provisions in these jurisdictions do not provide a 
normatively compelling case for a full entitlement to access to justice. Can the argument from 
non-domination do better? A strict comparison is impossible, there being no constitutions 
with non-domination provisions. But the argument from non-domination offered above does 
indeed get down to cases and makes a clear argument in favour of each component of access 
to justice, which was part of the rationale for focusing upon the hypothetical cases. And this 
shows that the argument satisfies the determinacy assumption. The argument from equality 
has not yet satisfied that assumption, but particular versions of it might.
94
  
 
*** 
 
In lieu of a conclusion, I make explicit two implicit challenges that inform this article. One 
may appear absurdly utopian – it invites us to imagine a world in which our elected 
representatives attend to articles like this when formulating policy positions on matters of 
legal-institutional design.
95
 In a political world in which evidence-based policy making has 
seemingly been rejected, a call for explicitly normatively informed policy making also seems 
doomed. Stranger things, however, have happened.
96
 The second challenge is to that 
supposedly sensible and pragmatic form of hard-headedness that many elected 
representatives, policy makers and others affect, which holds that, since we live in financially 
and fiscally troubled times, “belts must be tightened,” public spending cut, tough choices 
made. If the choice for the use of tax dollars is either heart operations for sick children or 
finance for free legal advice centres, then the former must win.
97
 This supposed hard-
headedness converts political choices – since 2008, the choice of fiscal austerity and public 
spending reductions – into natural necessities. We might well have tough choices to make, 
but this needs be shown rather than assumed. Furthermore, we will appreciate the true 
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difficulty of the choices we face only if we understand the stakes and values in play. This 
article has sought to show what is at stake when access to justice is denied or undermined.  
